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) 
[Crim. No. 6050. In Bank. Nov. 19, 1951.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VELVA IRENE 
McCAUGHAN, Appellant. 
[1] Statutes-Validity-Oerta.iDty.-A statute which either for-
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms 80 vague that 
men of common knowledge must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and diller as to its application violates the first essential 
of due process of law. 
[2] Oriminal Law-Prohibition b;y Law-Suftlciene;v and Validity 
of Enactment.-A statute must be definite enough to provide 
a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed 
as well as a standard for the ascertainment of guilt by the 
courts called on to apply it. 
[8] Statutes-Validity-Oertainty.-A statute will be upheld if 
its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to the 
common law or to its legislative history or PurPose. 
[4] Id.-Validity-Certainty.-A statute will be upheld, despite 
the fact that the acts it prohibits are defined in vague terms, 
if it requires an adequately defined specific intent. 
-[1] See Oal.Jur., Statutes, § 36; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 382. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 13, 14, 100; Am.Jur., 
Criminal Law, § 19. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Statutes, § 31; [2] Criminal 
Law, §9; [6-9,11,20] Insane Persons, §51.5; [10] Statutes, §36; 
[12] Criminal Law, § 561(1); [13-15] Witnesses, § 21; [16] Wit. 
nesses, § 32; [11,19] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [18] Criminal Law, 
§ 393(1). 
/J 
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[5] Id.-Validity-Certainty.-A court may not create a standard, 
and a specific intent defined in the same vague terms as those 
defining the prohibited acts does not make a statute acceptably 
definite. 
[8] Insane Persons-Offensea-ConstructioD and Validity of Stat-
ute.-Under Pen. Code, § 361, declaring that every person 
guilty of harsh, cruel or unkind treatment of, or any neglect of 
duty towards, any idiot, lunatic or insane person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor, the phrase "neglect of duty" means an inten-
tional or grossly negligent failure to exercise due diligence in 
the performance of a known official duty, and "cruel treatment" 
means the intentional infliction of pain for the mere purpose 
of causing pain; and if the code section were limited to the 
punishment of cruel treatment of or neglect of duty toward 
insane persons, it would not be unconstitutionally vague. 
[?] Id.-Offensea-ConstructioD of Statute.-Under Pen. Code, 
§ 361, declaring that every person guilty of harsh, cruel or 
unkind treatment of, or neglect of duty toward, any idiot, 
lunatic or insane person is guilty of a misdemeanor, the 
words "harsh" and "unkind" have no established common-law 
meaning nor any adjudicated meaning, and it is apparent from 
the dictionary meanings ascribed to them, most of them in-
definite themselves, that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at their meaning as used in the code sec-
tion and differ as to their application in a specific situation, 
and there is nothing to indicate that protection was meant to 
be limited to protection against physical harm or pain. 
[8] Id.-Offenses-ConstructioD and Validity of Statute.-Pen. 
Code, § 361, declaring that every person guilty of harsh, cruel 
or unkind treatment of, or any neglect of duty toward, any 
idiot, lunatic or insane person is guilty of a misdemeanor, 
requires a specific intent. but the words ''harsh'' and "unkind" 
do not provide an ascertainable standard of conduct or a 
workable standard of guilt, and insofar as it purports to make 
"harsh" treatment and "unkind" treatment criminal offenses, 
the code section is void for vagueness. 
(9] Id.-Offenses-Instructions.-In a prosecution for involuntary 
manslaughter based on a violation of Pen. Code, § 361, declar-
ing that every person guilty of harsh, cruel or unkind treat-
ment of, or any neglect of duty towards, any idiot, lunatic or 
insane person is guilty of a misdemeanor, an instruction that 
to convict defendant under that section the jury must find 
that she treated decedent "with an intent to be harsh, cruel 
or unkind • • • or with intent to neglect her" was erroneous, 
and where there vas conflicting evidence as to the nature of 
defendant's acts/and a general verdict of guilty, the error was 
prejudiciaL 
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[10] Statutes - Validity - Partial Invalidity.-The fact that a 
statute is ullconstitutional in part does not necessarily in-
validate the entire statute; the remaining parts may be pre-
served if they can be separated from the unconstitutional part 
without destroying the statutory scheme or purpose. 
[11] Insane Persons-Offenses-Validity of Statute.-The uncon-
stitutional provisions of Pen. Code, § 361, relating to "harsh" 
and "unkind" treatment of insane persons are severable from 
the constitutional provisions relating to "cruel" treatment and 
"neglect of duty" and do not vitiate the whole code section; 
since the dominant purpose of the code section to protect insane 
persons can be effected by the elimination of the severable un-
constitutional provisions, the constitutional provisions may 
stand alone and remain in force. 
[12] Oriminal Law-Evidence - Opinion Evidence - Examination 
of Experts.-Where the prosecution asked a doctor in a man-
slaughter case a hypothetical question what would be the cause 
of death if a person is sitting on a chair, with head and arms 
held back and another person sitting on her lap, then food is 
placed in her mouth, she is resisting the food, a towel is placed 
over her mouth, her nose is being held for a period of time, 
she slumps over and expires, and food is found lodged in her 
trachea, defendant's objection that the question omitted a ma-
terial fact in evidence, namely that the food found in dece-
dent's trachea was partially digested, should have been ~ 
tained, there being undisputed evidence that the food was 
partially digested. 
[13] Witnesses-Competency-Mental Condition.-Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1880, subd. 1, declaring that persons of unsound mind at the 
time of their production for examination cannot be witnesses, 
does not impose an absolute disqualification on insane persons; 
it does not undertake to proscribe or define the amount or 
degree of mental soundness that must exist in order to dis-
qualify a witness, but requires that the witness should have 
some apprehension of the obligation of an oath, and that he 
be capable of giving a fair account of the things he has seen 
or heard. 
[14] Id.-Competeney-Mental Condition.-Where a mental pa-
tient in a state hospital is proposed as a witness, the question 
to be determined is whether such person's mental derange-
ment or defect is such that he was deprived of the ability to 
perceive the event about which he is to testify or is deprived 
of the ability to recollect and communicate with reference 
thereto. 
[16] Id.-Competeney-Mental OonditiOD.-It is apparent from 
the requirement that a witness have the ability to give a sub-
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 300. 
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stantlltlly accurate /tl!count of the event witnessed that he must 
have had the ability to perceive the event with 8 suhstantial de· 
gree of accuracy. and if bt' was suffermg from 80mI' IUsane 
.lelusion or other llIental defect tbat deprived bim of tht' 
ability to perce IV", the event about which It IS proposed that 
he testify, he IS incompetent to testify about that event. 
thougb the language of Cod", Civ. Proc .. ~ 1880, is addressed 
to the time at whicb a wltnesl.' IS proposed for examination 
(Disapproving any implication to the contrary in People v. 
Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 288, 296 [110 P. 200]; People v. Tyree. 
21 Cal.App 701. 706-707 [132 P 784).,; McComb v. Afchison. 
etc. By. Co., 110 Cal.App. 303. 307-308 r294 P. 81); People v. 
Mendez. 193 Cal. 39, 48-49 [223 P. 65}; People v. Curry, 97 
Cal.App.2d 537. 541-542 [218 P.2d 11)3].) 
[1SJ Id.-oompetency-Determination.-The competency of a wit-
ness is to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of 
its judicial discretion, and sound discretion demands the exer· 
cise of great caution in qualifying as competent a witness who 
has a history of insane delusions relating to the subject of 
inquiry in a case in which the question is not simply whether 
or not an act was done but, rather, the manner in which it was 
done, and in which testimony as to the details may mean th", 
difference between conviction and acquittal. 
[17J Oriminal Law-Evidence-Other Orime8.-~xcept when it 
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends logi-
cally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material 
for the prosecution or to overcome any material fact sought 
to be proved by the defense is admissible although it may con-
nect the accused with an offense not included in the charge. 
[18] Id.-Evidence-Other Crime&.-ln determining whether evi-
dence of another crime is relevant to prove a material fact 
and not just criminal disposition, the trial court should be 
guided by the rule that such proof is to be received with ex-
treme caution, and if its connection with the crime charged 
is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor 
of the accused instead of suffering the minds of the jurors 
to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no 
proper evidence of the particular guilt. 
[1SJ Id.-Evidence-Other Crime&.-Where the People in an in-
voluntary manslaughter case were attempting to prove that 
defendant was guilty of a wilful and unlawful use of force on 
the person of decedent (Pen. Code, § 242), defendant's intent 
was in issue, and her treatment of decedent, a patient in a 
state hospital, on other occasions was relevant to prove the 
nature of her relations with decedent and her intent at the 
time of the otJeise charged. 
[20J Insane Persona-Offenses-Evidence.-In a prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter based on a violation of either Pen. 
Nov.1957} PEOl'LE V. MCCAUGHAN 
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Code, § 242 (battery) or § 861 (treatlDent of insane persons), 
it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude from evidence 
coroner's verdicts relating to six otber deaths from the aspira. 
tion of stomach contentil which occurred at the state hospital 
in question, on the ground that their admission would involn 
inquiry into an excessive number of collateral issues, namely 
the circumstances of each death. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis. 
laus County and from orders denying a new trial and grant. 
ing probation. Frank C. Damrell. Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. Orders denying 
new trial and admitting defendant to probation, reversed. 
Sutter & Carter and Douglas M. Sutter for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General. Doris a. Maier and 
John Fourt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of invol· 
untary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2), and the 
court denied her motion for a new trial. Judgment was sus-
pended, and defendant was admitted to probation for a term 
of three years on the condition that she serve one year in a 
county detention facility. Defendant appeals. 
Defendant was a psychiatric technician at the state hospital 
in Modesto in charge of a ward of 50 mental patients. One 
of the patients in defendant's ward was Grace Belill, a 71-
year-old woman suffering from involutional psychosis, a men· 
tal condition that commonly causes a patient to refuse to eat. 
On October 12. 1955, a doctor at the hospital noted in Aliss 
Belill's record that if necessary she was to be spoon fed. On 
October 14,1955, at the noon meal, Miss Belill was not eating, 
and defendant spoon fed her. During the feeding the patient 
collapsed and shortly thereafter died. The cause of death was 
asphyxiation from the aspiration of stomach contents. 
The gravamen of the charge against defendant is that she 
used improper methods and excessive force in spoon feeding 
the decedent. The People sought to prove that defendant's 
conduct constituted either criminal negligence or a misde-
meanor and that the misdemeanor consisted of a violation of 
either section 24! (battery) or section 361 (treatment of 
insane personsfof the Penal Code. The jury was given in-
) 
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structions appropriate to each of the People's theories, includ-
ing an instruction in the statutory language of section 361, 
and returned a g~neral verdict of guilty. 
Defendant contends that the provisions of section 361 are 
so vague and uncertain that her conviction thereunder is a 
denial of due process of law. [1] "[A] statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essen-
tial of due process of law." (Connally v. General Const. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 S.Ot. 126, 70 L.En. 322] ; Lanzetta v. 
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 [59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888] ; 
In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 685-687 [209 P. 896].) [2] A 
statute must be definite enough to provide a standard of con-
duct for those whose activities are proscribed as well as a 
standard for the ascertainment of guilt by the courts called 
upon to apply it. (Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 1l15-
516 [68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; In re Peppers, supra, 189 
Cal. at 685-687; People v. Building Maintenance etc . .Assn., 
41 Ca1.2d 719, 725 [264 P.2d 31] ; People v. Saoo, 105 Cal. 
App.2d Supp. 851, 854 [234 P.2d 785].) [3] A statute will 
be upheld if its terms may be made reasonably certain by 
reference to the common law (see Connally v. General Const. 
Co., supra, 269 U.S. at 391; Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 
Cal.2d 49, 60 [216 P.2d 859]) or to its legislative history or 
purpose. (See Connally v. General Const. Co., supra, 269 
U.S. at 391-392; People v. King, 115 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 
878 [252 P.2d 78].) [4] A statute will likewise be upheld, 
despite the fact that the acts it prohibits are defined in vague 
terms, if it requires an adequately defined specific intent. 
(See People v. Building Maintenance etc . .Assn., supra, 41 Cal. 
2d at 724 and cases cited.) [5] A court, however, may not 
create a standard (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra, 306 U.S. 
451; Connally v. General Const. Co., supra, 269 U.S. 385), 
and a specific intent defined in the same vague terms as those 
defining the prohibited acts does not make a statute accept-
ably definite. 
[6] Section 361 provides: "Every person guilty of any 
harsh, cruel, or unkind treatment of, or any neglect of duty 
towards, any idiot, lunatic, or insane person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor." The phrase "neglect of duty" has an ac-
cepted legal meaning. It means an intentional or grossly 
negligent failureffi exercise due diligence in the performance 
of a known officlaI duty. (See Rapaport v. Civil Service Com., 
Nov. 1957] PEOPLE v. MCCAUGHAN 
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134 CalApp. 319, 323·324 [25 P.2d 265]; M. F. Kemper 
Oonst. 00. v. Oity of Los Angeles, 37 Cal.2d 696, 702 [235 
P.2d 7]; People v. Perkins, 85 Cal. 509, 511 [26 P. 245]; 
Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse 00., 41 Cal.App.2d 741, 
747 [107 P.2d 501].) The word "cruel" has a commonly 
accepted meaning. It means" [d]isposed to give pain to 
others; willing or pleased to hurt or amict. . . ." (Web-
ster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., nnabridged.) 
"Cruel treatment" as used in a criminal statute has been 
defined to mean the intentional infliction of pain for the 
mere purpose of causing pain or indulging vindictive passions. 
(Oommonwealth v. Lufkin, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 579, 581.) 
It appears, therefore, that if section 361 were limited 
to the punishment of cruel treatment of or neglect of duty 
towards insane persons, it would not be nnconstitutionally 
vague. Defendant, however, directs her attack at the terms 
"harsh" treatment and "unkind" treatment. Webster's New 
International Dictionary, second edition, nnabridged, defines 
"harsh" as "1. Offensive to sense as being coarse, rough, grat-
ing, discordant, astringent .... 2. Offensive to the sensibili· 
ties; disagreeable to one's feeling of aesthetic or intellectual 
propriety .... 3. Of persons or things, offensive to a sense 
of justice or kindness; unfeeling, severe, cruel,- nnduly rigor. 
ous. . • . 4. Offensive to the physical feelings; roughly nn· 
pleasant; causing physical discomfort. . . ." The same au-
thority defines "unkind" as .. [n]ot kind, esp., wanting in 
kindness, sympathy, or the like; hence, cruel; harsh." [7] It 
is apparent from the mere recitation of the meanings ascribed 
to "harsh" and "unkind," most of them indefinite them-
selves, that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at the meaning of these words as used in the statute 
and that they will differ as to their application in a specific 
situation. The words in question have no established common 
law meaning. Nor have they any adjudicated meaning. Al-
though section 361 has been in the Penal Code since its adop-
tion in 1872, and although the New York statute (New York 
Penal Code (1864), § 425), which served as the model for 
our code section (Rev. Laws of the State of California (1871), 
vol. IV, § 361, Code Commission note), contains identical 
language, the terms "harsh" treatment and "unkind" treat-
ment have never been construed by an appellate court either 
in New York or ip. this state. Referring to the purpose 
of the statute to protect insane persons, the attorney general 
contends that, like "cruel" treatment, the terms "harsh" 
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treatment and .. unkind" treatment should be limited to 
mean treatment likely to cause physical harm or pain. We find 
nothing in the statute, however, indicating that protection 
was meant to be limited to protection against physical harm 
or pain. lndeed, the use of the words •• harsh" and ., unkind" 
in addition to the word "cruel" indicates that protection wa~ 
not meant to be so limited. 
[8] The trial court correctly interpreted section 361 as 
requiring a specific intent (see People v. Vogel, 46 Ca1.2d 798, 
801 [299 P.2d 850] ; Pe.ople v. Stuart, 47 gal.2d 167, 173 [302 
P.2d 5]) and instructed the jury tha~to convict defendant 
under that section they must find tliat she treated the de-
cedent" ... with an intent to be harsh, cruel or unkind 
... or with intent to neglect her." The requirement that 
defendant must have acted with an intent to be harsh or 
unkind, however, does not make clear what those words mean. 
We conclude that the words "harsh" and "unkind" 
do not provide an ascertainable standard of conduct or a 
workable standard of guilt and that insofar as it purports, 
without further definition, to make "harsh" treatment and 
"unkind" treatment criminal offenses,section 361 of the 
Penal Code is void for vagueness. [9] The court's instruction 
relating to section 361, given in the language of the statute, 
was therefore erroneous, and in view of the conflicting evi-
dence as to the nature of defendant's acts and the general 
verdict, the error must be deemed prejudicial. (Oettinger v. 
Stewart, 24 CaI.2d 133, 140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221] ; 
Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal.2d 765, 771 [167 P.2d 193]; 
Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 OaI.2d 628, 643-644 
[220 P.2d 897] ; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106-107 
[65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495].) The orders appealed from 
must, therefore, be reversed. Since the reversal may result 
in a new trial, however, it is necessary to determine whether 
section 361 is valid in part and to consider several other al-
leged errors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) 
[10] The fact that a statute is unconstitutional in part 
does not necessarily invalidate the entire statute. The remain-
ing parts of the statute may be preserved if they can be sepa-
rated from the unconstitutional part without destroying the 
statutory scheme or purpose. (Danskin v. San Diego Unified 
Sck. Dist., 28 Ca1.2d 536, 555 [171 P.2d 885] ; Ex parte Gerin.o, 
143 Cal. 412, 420,. [77 P. 166, 66 L.R.A. 249].) [11] The 
unconstitutional/provisions relating to "harsh"and "un-
kind" treatment are severable from the constitutional pro-
J 
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visions relating to .. cruel" treatmeut /lnd .. neglect of duty" 
and do not vitiate the whole statute. Since the dominant pur· 
pose of the statute to protect insane persons can be effected 
by the elimination of the severable unconstitutional provisions, 
the constitutional provisions may stand alone and remain in 
force. (People v. Lewis. 13 Ca1.2d 280, 284 [89 P.2d ~88].) 
We conclude, therefore, that insofar as it provides that any 
person guilty of any ". . . cruel . . . treatment of, or any 
ueglect of duty towards any idiot, lunatic, or insane person 
. . ." is guilty of a misdemeanor, section 361 is a valid 
statute. 
Defendant contends that as a matter of law the evidence 
that the decedent's death was caused by an act of defendant 
does not support her conviction. The evidence viewed most 
favorably to respondent discloses that defendant fed the dece· 
cient three tablespoons of cubed, creamed potatoes. She held 
the decedent's head back by grasping her hair with one hand 
and fed her with the other. At intervals during the feeding 
defendant covered the decedent's mouth and nose with a 
towel. Another attendant was holding the decedent's arms. 
andat some time during the feeding or immediately there· 
after a hospital inmate sat on the decedent's lap. At some 
time during the feeding the decedent wiggled her legs. After 
the third spoon of food was put into her mouth the decedent 
collapsed. Efforts to revive her failed, and shortly thereafter 
she died. Dr. Miller, who performed the autopsy, testified that 
she found lodged in the decedent'a trachea and bronchi three 
to four tablespoons of partially digested food, white in color 
and creamy in substance. The cause of death was established 
as asphyxiation from the aspiration of stomach contents. Dr. 
Miller testified that no food was found in the decedent's 
stomach and explained on cross-examination that the decedent 
must have swallowed the food as it was fed, regurgitated, and 
then aspirated the regurgitated matter. At the time of her 
death, the decedent was au1i'ering from chronic inftammation 
of the gall bladder with stone formation, and a quantity of 
"bile-tinged" liquid, characteristic of a gall bladder attack. 
was found in her stomach. Decedent also had coronary arterio· 
sclerosis; the inside diameter of the anterior descending 
branch of the left' coronary was reduced in size to that of a 
pin point. 
It is defendant',eontention that there is no proof whatever 
that any act of 6ers caused the decedent to regurgitate and 
.c.Jd-H 
'/j 
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aspirate the stomach contents and that, on the contrary, there 
is ('videnc(' that these events were not caused by defendant's 
acts. [12] Th;e district attorney asked Dr. Miller the follow· 
ing hypothetical question: 
"U a person is sitting on a chair, and her head is held back 
by the hair of her head RO that her face is looking up toward~ 
the ceiling-also, her arms are being held, and another person 
is Ritting on her lap--and then an amount of food is placed 
into the person's mouth. and she is resisting the food-and 
then a towel is placed over her mouth and her nose is also 
being held for a period of time, and then the person slumps 
over and thereafter expires, and approximately four heaping 
tablespoons of food is found lodged in the trachea; now, Doc-
tor, based upon this hypothetical question, what would be the 
cause of death, Doctor!" 
Defendant objected to the question on the ground that it 
omitted a material fact in evidence, namely that the food 
found in the decedent's trachea was partially digested. The 
court overruled the objection, and Dr. Miller ans,vered, "The 
cause of death would be due to asphyxia, caused by obstruc-
tion of the trachea with food." The objection should have 
been sustained. The undisputed evidence was that the food 
waS partially digested. This faet was essential to a considera-
tion of causation, for it showed that the food had been in the 
stomach and must have been regurgitated and that, there-
fore, it was not aspirated directly as it was pnt into the dece-
dent's mouth. 
It is obvious that the hypothetical question and Dr. 
Miller's answer did not advance the inqUiry into what caused 
the decedent to regurgitate and aspirate her stomach contents. 
Dr. Miller had previously testified to the cause of death. Her 
answer to the hypothetical question merely repeated that 
testimony, and her answer was obviously based on only two of 
the facts in the question. namely that the decedent died and 
that approximately four tablespoons of food were found 
lodged in her trachea. On cross-examination Dr. Miller testi~ 
tied that she did not know what caused the decedent to re-
gurgitate, that it was possible that either the decedent's heart 
condition or her gall bladder condition could have caused it, 
but that she thought these possibilities improbable. Dr. Toller, 
a defense witness, was presented with the same hypothetical 
set of facts presenteP to Dr. Miller. It was his opinion that 
none of the circuniStances disclosed therein, either singly or 
collectively, . could have caused the decedent to regurgitate 
.... ~ 
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and aspirate her stomach contents. He testified that it was 
possible that the regurgitation might have been caused by the 
decedent's heart condition or gall bladder condition. He sug-
gested as a third possibility that the regurgitation might have 
been eaused by the decedent's revulsion because of her mental 
coudition to the thought of eating. 
Thus, the testimony of the expert witnesses supports 
defendant's contention. If the jury rejected the opinion evi-
dence, however, they could infer that the manner in which 
the decedent was fed was at least a contributing cause of her 
regurgitation or that, even if the regurgitation was not caused 
by an act of defendant, her placing the towel over the de-
cedent's mouth and nose preventing the vomitus from escap-
ing was the cause of the decedent's aspirating the regurgi-
tated matter. The latter inference is weakened by the fact that 
neither the time at which the decedent regurgitated nor the 
time at which the towel was held over her mouth and nose 
was established and also by the fact that it was not shown 
that the vomitus ever came high enough into the throat to be 
expelled through the mouth. We cannot say as a matter of 
law, however, that either of these inferences is unreasonable . 
Defendant contends that the court erred in qualifying as 
competent witnesses several mental patients in the state hos-
pital at Modesto. All of these patients were in the ward over 
which defendant had supervision, and some of them had his-
tories of insane delusions relating to food and to persecution 
by hospital personnel. Much of the evidence most· damaging 
to defendani is in the testimony of these patients. We deem 
it unnecessary to discuss the witnesses individually, for their 
testimonial qualifications may be changed at the time of a 
new trial and would have to be reexamined at that time. Our 
review of the record, however, indicates the desirability of 
our reviewing the rules goveruing the qualifications of an 
insane person as a witness. 
Section 1321 of the Penal Code provides, with exceptions 
with which we are not here concerned, that the rules for deter-
mining the competency of. witnesses in civil actions apply also 
to criminal actions. [13] Section 1880 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides: "The following persons cannot be wit-
nesses. 1. Those who are of unsound mind at the time of their 
production for examination .... " This section, however, 
does not impose ~ . ..gbsolute disqualification on insane persons. 
As was said in People v. Tyree, 21 Cal.App. 701, 706 [132 
P. 784],"The statute does not undertake to prescribe or defin~ 
420 PEOPLE v. MCCAUGHAN [49 C.2d 
the amount or degree of mental unsoundness that must exist 
in order to disqualify the witness, but the reason for the 
existence of such a statute should be invoked, and we inter· 
pret that reason to require that the witness should have some 
apprehension of the obligation of an oath, and that he Sh,u.J 
be capable of giving a fairly correct account of the thi~gs 
he has seen or heard, and this test should be made with speCIal 
reference to the field of inquiry and character of the subject 
on which the witness is to give testimony." 
[14] The question to be determined is. whether the pro· 
posed witness's mental derangement or defect is such that he 
was deprived of the ability to perceive the event about which 
he is to testify or is deprived of the ability to recollect and 
communicate with reference thereto. (People v. lves, 17 Cal. 
2d 459, 476 [110 P.2d 408] ; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 
288,294 [123 P. 200] ; see Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 
2. §§ 493-495, pp. 586-587.) It bears emphasis that the wit-
ness's competency depends upon his ability to perceive, re-
collect, and communicate. (See Wigmore on Evidence, S1tpra, 
~ 478, p. 519.) Whether he did perceive accurately, does 
recollect, and is communicating accurately and truthfully are 
questions of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact. 
[15] The language of section 1880 is addressed to the time 
at which a witness is produced for examination, and there is 
language in several cases suggesting that insanity at the time 
of the event witnessed is not a matter for consideration in the 
determination whether or not a proposed witness is competent 
to testify. (See People v. Harrison. supra, 18 Cal.App. at 296: 
Peopte v. Tyree, supra, 21 Cal.App. at 706-707; McComb v 
Atchison etc. By. Co., 110 Cal.App. 303, 307-308 [294 P. 811 : 
Peopte v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39. 48·49 [223 P. 651; People v. 
Curry, 97 Cal.App.2d 537, 541-542 [218 P.2d 153].) The 
rule is to the contrary. It is apparent from the requirement 
that the witness have the ability to give a substantially ac-
curate account of the event witnessed (People v. Tyree, S1'pra. 
21 Cal.App. at 706-708 and cases there cited; People v. lves. 
supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 476) that he must have had the ability 
to perceive the event with a substantial degree of accuracy. 
Moreover, section 1879 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
requires as a general testimonial qualification the ability to 
perceive the event about which testimony is to be given. (See 
also Wigmore on Evidence. supra. §§ 492-493. p. 586; Brad-
burn v. Peac09s: 135 Cal.App.2d 161, 164 [286 P.2d 972], 
conatruing Code Civ. Proc., § 1880, subd. 2; Code Civ. Proc., 
) 
) 
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§ 1845.) It follows that if the proposed witness was suf· 
fering from some insane delusion or other mental defect 
that deprived him of the ability to perceive the event about 
which it is proposed that he testify, he is incompetent to 
testify about that event. Any implication to the contrary in 
the foregoing cases is disapproved. 
[16] [t is universally recognized that the competency of 
a witness is to be determined by the trial court in the exercise 
of its judicial discretion. (Poople v. lves, supra, 17 Cal.2d 
at 476; People v. Harrison, supra, 18 Cal.App. at 295; see 
McCormick on Evidence, p. 123.) Manifestly, however, sound 
discretion demands the exercise of great caution in qualifying 
as competent a witness who has a history of insane delusions 
relating to the very subject of inquiry in a case in which the 
question is not simply whether or not an act was done but, 
rather, the manner in which it was done and in which testi-
mony as to details may mean the difference between convic-
tion and acquittal. 
Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing two 
prosecution witnesses to testify, over defendant's objections, 
that defendant used improper methods and excessive force 
in feeding the decedent the morning meal on the day of her 
death and on several ·other occasions. Defendant contends 
that the only purpose of this evidence was to prejudice the 
jury against her and that it should have been excluded. 
[17] "It is settled in this state that except when it shows 
merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically 
and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for 
the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought to 
be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may con· 
nect the accused with an offense not included in the charge." 
(Peop/,e v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509 (218 P.2d 981].) 
[18] In determining whether such evidence is relevant to 
prove a material fact and not just criminal disposition, the 
trial court should be guided by the rule that "such proof is to 
be received with 'extreme caution.' and if its connection with 
the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to 
be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the 
minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact. 
carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." 
(People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7]; see 
a~o People v. r:~te, 28 Cal.2d 306. 316 [169 P.2d 924].) If 
such evidence is determined to be relevant to prove a material 
fact in issue, it is for the trial court in the exercise ()f its 
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judicial discretion to determine whether its probative value 
is outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect and to admit 
or exclude it accordingly, for" [t]his is a situation where 
the policy of protecting a defendant from undue prejudice 
conflicts with the rule of logical relevance, and a proper 
rletcrmination as to which should prevail rests in the sound 
discl'etion of the trial court, and not merely on whether the 
evidence comes within certain categories ...• " (State v. 
Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367 [218 P.2d 300. 306] ; see also Adkins 
v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258-259 [193 .. P: 251]; Jackson, J., in 
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [69 S.Ct. 
213. 93 L.Ed. 168]; Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evt-
dence,46 Harv. L. Rev. 954, 984-985; McCormick on Evidence 
(1954), § 157, pp. 332-333.) 
The People were attempting to prove that defendant was 
guilty of a willful and unlawful use of force upon the person 
of the decedent. (Pen. Code, § 242,' supra.) [19] Defend-
ant's intent was clearly in issue, and her treatment of the 
decedent on other occasions was relevant· to prove the nature 
of her relations with the decedent and her intent at the time 
of the offense charged. (People v. Palassou, 14 Cal.App. 123, 
126-127 [111 P. 109] ; People v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330, 341-342 
[202 P.2d 53].) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's admitting the testimony to which defendant objects. 
[20] Defendant also contends that the trial court erred 
in excluding from evidence coroner's verdicts relating to six 
other deaths from the aspiration of stomach contents, which 
occurred at the state hospital at Modesto in 1955. Defendant 
sought to show by these records that the other deaths oc-
curred naturally and to prove thereby that this decedent's 
death was not caused by any act of defendant. The court did 
permit defendant to adduce testimony that mental patients 
suffering from involutional melancholia are predisposed to 
regurgitation and that the records of the Stanislaus County 
coroner's office disclosed six deaths in the county in 1955 from 
the aspiration of stomach contents, all of them occurring at 
the state hospital in Modesto. The court excluded the coroner's 
verdicts, however, on the grounds that their admission would 
involve inquiry into an excessive number of collateral issues, 
namely the circumstances surrounding each death. It was 
for the trial court to determine whether the probative value 
of the offered evidence was outweighed by the necessity of 
inquiring into collateral issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1868.) 
We find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the coroner's 
verdicts. 
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Other alleged errors and defendant's contention that the 
district attorney was guilty of misconduct need not be con-
sidered, since the occurrences complained of are not likely to 
attend a new trial. 
The orders denying a new trial and admitting defendant to 
probation are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
